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THEODORE A. YOUNG

Classical Vs. Minute Philosophy*
Although George Berkeley is famous, he is not well known. His fame rests upon
his intricately argued conclusions, in the name of common sense, that material
substance does not exist, that Nature is a system of ideas that cannot exist without
the mind, and that Nature is a language spoken to us by God, its author. What is
not well known is that Berkeley was moved to defend idealism against materialism,
common sense and realism against skepticism, and theism against atheism, by a desire
to provide a modern metaphysical foundation for the classical moral and political
philosophy of virtue, according to which the good life for the individual and the body
politic depends on development of the moral habits of wisdom, courage, temperance,
and justice If little attention is paid in our time to this part of Berkeley's philosophy
I suppose it is because modern theories of reality and knowledge have made it seem
hopelessly outdated. To be sure, a striking feature of many post-Berkeleyan attempts,
even beyond Nietzsche, to establish morality is the maintenance of at least some, if
not most, of the values inherited from the classical and Judea-Christian traditions.
However, as Alasdair Macintyre rightly judges, I believe, "modern moral utterance
and practice can only be understood as a series of fragmented survivals from an older
past ... the deontological [having to do with duty, e.g. as in Kant] character of moral
judgements is the ghost of conceptions of divine law which are quite alien to the
metaphysics of modernity ... the teleological [having to do with ends or consequences,
e.g. as in J.S. Mill] character is similarly the ghost of conceptions of human nature
and activity which are equally not at home in the modern world .. ?' 1
Nonetheless, Macintyre is perhaps foremost among those currently urging a return
to virtue. He thinks, or hopes, that it can be done without the support of either
metaphysics or religion. Some, like Gilbert C. Meilaender, 2 argue for religion as playing a, perhaps the, crucial role in development of virtue. Others, like Berkeley and
myself, see both religion and metaphysics as necessary to virtue.
Perhaps we would do well to qualify the above judgements by distinguishing between philosophers and ordinary people. Students of Berkeley will remember his defense
of us common sensical plain folk against the new scientific philosophers, like Bacon,
Descartes, and Locke. Maybe Macintyre should say "modern philosophical world"
instead of "modern world:' when speaking of ghosts of the past. For do not the un*This is a shortened and modified version of a paper to be published, as one of a series of es'says, by the Heraclitean Society of
Western Michigan University, in celebration of the tercentenary (1985) of George Berkeley's birth.
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sophisticated among us, while the philosophers are theorizing about deontos, utility,
will, and "doing" meta-ethics, some of them, anyhow, go on pursuing virtue? And
for all that, are not some at least of our most skillful meta-ethicists brave and true?
Still, Berkeley in his time could not, and we in ours cannot, help seeing the consequences ideas have. The permissiveness that has grown so much in our time was already
evident in Berkeley's time; only he called it licentiousness or libertinism, our word
"permissiveness" perhaps being a sign that we are now even permissive about what
we label intemperate or foolish behavior.
To return to the point, Berkeley saw both metaphysics and religion as necessary
to underwrite and support virtue. His metaphysics failed, and because of that he would
not be surprised at the growth since then of what he fought life-long against:
materialism, skepticism, atheism, irreligion and immorality. I believe, however, that
Berkeley's project can be completed. 3 However, this paper will be restricted to a review
of Berkeley's version of classical moral and political philosophy and his opposition
to free-thinking.
Berkeley's writing on morals, politics, education, and the importance of religion
to the body politic are all in the spirit of classical moral philosophy, and directed against
free-thinking. Free-thinking, taking freedom to be the end of human living, and inspired by scientific philosophy, opposes religious, moral, and political authority (taken
usually by free-thinkers to be either actual or potential oppression.) Against this Berkeley
argued (1) that freedom is a means to the true end of human living, a well-being or
happiness that comes only with the development of moral character; (2) that because
man is by nature a political animal, our happiness depends also on the stability of
good body politic; (3) that right religion is the main stay of behavior, free-thinking
undermines the stability of the body politic; (5) that education, properly understood,
has moral and political aims: to promote virtue in all citizens, and to provide for
enlightened political leadership.
Free-thinking has been defined as "a conscious reaction against some phase or phases
of conventional or traditional doctrine in religion - on the one hand, a claim to think
freely, ... ; on the other hand, the actual practice of such thinking:' An historian of
free-thinking regards the phenomenon to be as old as the human race, and asserts
that modern free-thinking "is only one of the developments of the slight primary capacity of man to doubt, reason, to improve on past thinking, to assert his personality
as against even sacrosanct and menacing authority:' 4 Inspired particularly by the Reformation and the rise of modern science, modern free-thinkers have aimed to free us
all from religious oppression, with respect to both practice and faith. The faith of
the free-thinker is that reason, freed from religious dogmatic control, can and will discover
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on its own the truth about man and the universe. If there are any doctrines that
free-thinkers share, they are atheism, either theoretical and/or practical, and equality. As to the latter, the contention is that we are all equipped, by virtue of our reason,
to seek the truth. Many modern free-thinkers in Berkeley's time and beyond look
to science as the model, and scientific method as the proper use of reason. Some more
shallow types take equality to mean that each of us is free to interpret and criticize
any doctrine, religious, scientific, or otherwise, in his own lights, bowing to no external authority whatever. The practical consequences of free-thinking seem to be that
morally each of us go his own way, and politically we contrive a system whereby selfish,
party, or factional interest can somehow be turned to work for the general welfare
of the body politic.
Because Berkeley fought life-long against free-thinking, and because free-thinking
opposes religious oppression and champions liberty, truth, equality, reason, and science,
it would seem that Berkeley is for religious oppression, and against liberty, truth, equality, reason and science. But in fact he was not. Indeed, Berkeley saw that supposed
warfare between religion and science rests on the naturalistic bias of modern science.
That bias may be, probably is, good policy for scientific investigation, but naturalism
is a philosophical, not a scientific, conclusion. Berkeley saw naturalism as a bias insufficiently warranted by the science of his time, and not at all warranted by the common experience of mankind. At the same time he knew that the bias could not be
countered with Bible-waving and pulpit-pounding. (Indeed, if there is warfare between science and religion, place your bets on science.) Berkeley's metaphysical rejoinder
to naturalism was to prove that matter does not exist, and that Nature is a language
spoken to us by God. For now we want to indicate his classical response to free-thinking.
In other words, the supposed warfare between religion and science is really between
classical philosophy and minute philosophy (Berkeley's preferred term for free-thinking).
What follows aims to give a sense of how Berkeley argues for the five points laid
down above. First, liberty and truth. In two short essays 5 Berkeley make his point
that each of these highly esteemed values in our Western civilization is a means to
our well-being, but neither is an end of human life. The argument rests on the distinction, reminiscent of Glaucon's classification of good things at the beginning of Book
2 of Plato's The Republic, between instrumental and intrinsic good. The former are
valued for the sake of some other good, the latter are valued as ends in themselves.
When we pause to reflect that the true end of human living is well-being or happiness, we than recognize that we value liberty and truth as being instrumental to
that end. For Berkeley, following the likes of Plato and Aristotle, our happiness depends
in large part upon developing moral character; becoming wise, courageous, temperate,
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just, and so forth. Liberty and truth may be instrumental to that. But if liberty is
taken as an end in itself, we may defend all sorts of questionable moral practices,
in the name of liberty; if truth is taken as an end in itself, we may, e.g., defend our
ridiculing of some simple person's blind faith, without having anything better, for
the direction of human living, to replace it.
The seond counter to free-thinking is that while each of us is indeed a primary
being, an individual, a person, still we are by nature political animals. None of us
can satisfy human needs, whether bodily or, especially, rational and/or spiritual, save
by living in political community. Berkeley expresses this classical political theory in
"Passive Obedience;'6 an essay on the Christian doctrine of not rebelling against the
supreme-political power. Unlike Hobbes' pessimistic view of human nature, according
to which we live naturally as isolated individuals, at war with one another, and therefore
political revolution is bad policy because if successful it will return us to that natural
life which is "solitary, nasty, poor, brutish, and short;' Berkeley argues that rebellion
is unnatural because we are naturally political. (What either Hobbes or Berkeley would
say in the light of the totalitarian regimes of our "enlightened" century is interesting
to speculate. But perhaps it is a moot question, given today's technological means
of enforcing tyranny.) At any rate, Berkeley's main point, and it seems really beyond
dispute, is that our well-being here and now depends in large part on the stability
of a good body politic.
The third point is that right religion is the main stay of a good body politic. His
contention here is a function of his account of equality, another prime value in our
Western civilization. Berkeley rejects the free-thinking notion of equality because of
his observation that we are not all equally equipped to pursue the truth. In his last
work Berkeley aphorizes that "Truth is the cry of all, but the game of a few;' 7 echoing
again the classical teaching of Plato. There is a two-fold paradox here.
Modern philosophy, inspired by free-thinking's declaration of independence from
religion and theology, and placing its faith in reason's ability to discover truth, abounds
in skeptical doctrines, from David Hume (or should we say Rene Descartes) to Richard
Rorty. Classical philosophy, joined by Berkeley who fought skepticism life-long, insists that reason can come to know, but then declaims that few, if any, can achieve
genuine wisdom, Modern philosophy's conclusion seems to be that we are equally
dumb, especially on moral matters. No wonder that equality becomes a good in itself,
if there is nothing it can be good for. Berkeley's response to the classical puzzle reason can know, but few of us have the nature and nurture to achieve the wisdom
necessary to the good life - is two-fold. First, he finds our notion of equality grounded, not in reason, but in religion. The New Testament, or New Covenant, reveals
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that before God we are all equally humbled, but through faith, hope, and love all
equally uplifted. As a matter of fact, is not Berkeley right? Is there, in our Western
civilization, a rational source, independent of religion, for equality? Does not equality, as well as it reconciliation with liberty, depend on fraternity? And does not
brotherhood depend on our having a common, loving Father? Second, and following directly and obviously, Berkeley's practical conclusion to the classical puzzle is
that religion, specifically Christianity, must be promulgated for the sake of the moral
welfare of the many, and for the health of the body politic. Incidentally, at least some
of our Founding Fathers, whom the free-thinkers claim as their own, agree with Berkeley
in this. George Washington, in his Farewell address, declared:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and
morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute
of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness
- these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens.
And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained
without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to
expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.
And Jefferson asked rhetorically, "Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure
when we have removed this only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people
that their liberties are the gift of God?"
The fourth point is that in removing the religious motive to good behavior, freethinking undermines the stability of the body politic. By an appeal to history the
free-thinker can respond to Berkeley's claim that religion, not reason, is the great
equalizer and unifier. We cannot help noticing the wide variety of religions which
tend to set us apart from one another; and even within Christianity, competing sects
have, and continue to, set us against one another, even to the extent of open warfare.
By contrast, agreed upon scientific knowledge brings us together. Berkeley and his
supporters cannot but acknowledge the force of this argument. However, the flaw
in the free-thinking argument is that modern science is not philosophy, and the prevailing scientific method is not a way to moral and political knowledge. Scientific reason,
concentrating on what is, and eschewing all value judgements, can give us no guidance
on how we ought to live. Hence, while minute philosophy withdraws the religious
support for political stability, it has nothing to put in its place. Berkeley's task, then,
is to argue that right religion, buttressed by classical philosophy, can provide the support. Whether or not he succeeds you can decide for yourselves when and if you
read his moral and political works.
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The fifth point is that education, properly understood, has the dual aim of promoting virtue in all citizens and providing for enlightened political leadership. It is
astonishing how well Berkeley anticipated the educational ethos in place in our world.
Consider this judgement on education a la the "corpuscularian and mechanical
philosophy;' which, if Whitehead is right 8, and I think he is, still provides the organizing
principles of every university in the world. Such a study, Berkeley says:
... might usefully enough have employed some share of the leisure and curiosity of inquisitive persons. But when it entered the seminaries of learning as a
necessary accomplishment, and most important part of education, by engrossing men's thoughts, and fixing their minds so much on corporeal objects and
the laws of motion, it hath, however undesignedly, indirectly and by accident,
yet not a little indisposed them for spiritual, moral, and intellectual matters.
Certainly had the philosophy of Socrates and Pythagoras prevailed in this age
among those who think themselves too wise to receive the dictates of the Gospel,
we should not have seen interest take so general and fast hold on the minds
of men, nor public spirit reputed to be ... a generous folly, among those who
are reckoned to be the most knowing as well as the most getting part of mankind. 9
And even apart form what we might take to be precipitate judgement by Berkeley
in the above quotation, we all recognize that scientific education sheds no light on
moral and political matters.
Berkeley even presages social science, although in a sarcastic manner. In Alciphron,one
of the free-thinkers derides the sterile classical education of Berkeley's day, and extols
free-thinking's substitute: ·~ .. we have among us some contemplative spirits of a coarser
education, who, from observing the behavior and proceedings of apprentices, watermen,
porters, and the assemblies of rabble in the streets, have arrived at a profound
knowledge of human nature, and made great discoveries about the principles, springs,
and motive of moral actions. These have demolished the received systems, and done
a world of good in the city:' 10 Apart from wondering what good two hundred years
of such studies have done for our cities, we can note that to the extent that the social
sciences emulate the hard sciences, they eschew value judgements; and so can shed
no light on moral and political matters. Moreover, the sweep of value free philosophy
seems complete when we ponder that most professional and academic philosophers
themselves avoid what Berkeley say Socrates regarded as the true business of a
philosopher. In a 1709 letter to his friend, Percival, Berkeley wrote,
Socrates spent his time in reasoning on the most noble and important subjects,
the nature of gods, the dignity and duration of the soul, and the duties of a
rational creature. He was always exposing the vanity of the Sophists, painting
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vice and virtue in their proper colours, deliberating on the public good, enflaming the most noble and generous tempers with the love of great actions. In short,
his whole employment was the turning men aside from vice, impertinence, and
trifling speculations to the study of solid wisdom, temperance, justice, and piety, which is the true business of a philosopher.ll
Philosophy, as logico-linguistic analysis, has become a specialty in this age of specialization; and one of a second order at that, the first order specialties being the various
disciplines which use logic and language to talk about reality.
That leaves the arts and humanities to wrestle with values. Berkeley seemed to anticipate the humanities, understood as being cut off from a world of scientific fact.
In Alciphron, a free-thinker caricatures the capped and gowned academicians of the
eighteenth century, poring over dead authors who wrote in dead languages, cut off
from the real world; and recommends the new philosophers;: .. the best bred men
of the age, men who know the world, men of pleasure, men of fashion, and fine
gentlemen;' who have no method but free and easy conversation. The character
Alciphron, in his turn, caricatures the stuffy bookworms who meditate on "... obsolete notions, that are now quite exploded and out of use:' 12 Berkeley locates these
teachers in the taverns and coffee houses. Were he to visit us today, he would judge
that they have moved into the academy. Values are certainly discussed, but more in
accord with the literal meaning of "discuss": torn apart and scattered. I leave it to
you who have studied in the arts and humanities to weigh Berkeley's judgment about
free and easy conversation, asking you to remember that hardly any of us is required
to read the greats, such a Plato, Aquinas, Bacon, Shakespeare, Marx, and Berkeley.
Berkeley had no illusions about the classical education he advocated- reading and
conversing the greats. He did not look back to some golden age. But he did praise
philosophers like Plato for trying to raise the refine humankind, and trying to provide education for moral and political leadership. Some sense of that you will get
from the following quotations, the latter of which is the final passage in Alciphron.
The profound thinkers of the free-thinking way have taken a direct contrary
course to all the philosophers of former ages, who made it their endeavor to
raise and refine human-kind, and remove it as far as possible from the brute;
to moderate and subdue men's appetities; to remind them of the dignity of their
nature; to awaken and improve their superior faculties, and direct them to the
noblest objects; to possess men's minds with a high sense of the Divinity, of
the Supreme Good, and the immortality of the soul. They took great pains to
strengthen the obligations to virtue; and upon all those subjects have wrought
out noble theories, and treated with singular force of reason. But it seems our

14

minute philosophers act the reverse of all other wise and thinking men; it being
their end and aim to erase the principles of all that is great and good from the
mind of man, to unhinge all order of civil life, to undermine the foundations
of morality, and, instead of improving and enabling our natures, to bring us
down to the maxims and way of thinking of the most uneducated and barbarous
nations, and even to degrade humankind to a level with the brute beasts. And
all the while they would pass upon the world for men of deep knowledge. But,
in effect, what is all this negative knowledge better than downright savage ignorance? That there is no Providence, no spirit, no future state, no moral duty:
truly a fine system for an honest man to own, or an ingenious man to value
himself upon! 13
In good earnest, I imagine that thinking is the great desideratum of the present
age; and that the real cause of whatever is amiss may justly be reckoned the
general neglect of education in those who need it most - the people of fashion.
What can be expected where those who have the most influence have the least
sense, and those who are sure to be followed set the worst example? where youth
so uneducated are yet so forward? where modesty is esteemed pusillanimity, and
a deference to years, knowledge, religion, laws, want of sense and spirit? Such
untimely growth of genius would not have been valued or encouraged by the
wise men of antiquity, whose sentiments on this point are so ill suited to the
genius of our times that it is to be feared modern ears could not bear them.
But, however ridiculous such maxims might seem to our ... youth, who are so
capable and so forward to try experiments, and mend the constitution of their
country, I believe it will be admitted by men of sense that, if the governing part
of mankind would in these days, for experiment's sake, consider themselves in
that old Homericallight as pastors of the people, whose duty it was to improve
their flock, they would soon find that this is to be done by an education very
different from the modern, and otherguess maxims than those of the minute
philosophy. If our youth were really inured to thought and reflexion, and an
acquaintance with the excellent writers of antiquity, we should see that licentious humour, vulgarly called free-thinking, banished from the presence of
gentlemen, together with ignorance and ill taste; which as they are inseparable
from vice, so men follow vice for the sake of pleasure, and fly from virtue through
an abhorrence of pain. Their minds, therefore, betimes should be formed and
accustomed to receive pleasure and pain from proper objects, or, which is the
same thing, to have their inclinations and aversions rightly placed ... This, according to Plato and Aristotle, was the right education. And those who, in their
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own minds, their health, or their fortunes, feel the cursed effects of a wrong
one, would do well to consider they cannot better make amends for what was
amiss in themselves than by preventing the same in their posterity.14
Since Berkeley's time minute philosophy has made great strides, in the main because
neither Berkeley nor anyone else has been able to provide a modern metaphysical
foundation for the classical humanistic philosophy of virtue. The decline of religious,
and the growth of secular, humanism can be traced to the same cause. Whether we
side with Berkeley or the free-thinker, we at least should learn from Berkeley that
the warfare is not between religion and science, as the free-thinker would have us
believe, but between classical and minute philosophy, or more broadly between classical
and modern philosophy.
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